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Abstract
Cultural evolutionary theories define prestige as social rank that is freely conferred on 
individuals possessing superior knowledge or skill, in order to gain opportunities to learn 
from such individuals. Consequently, information provided by prestigious individuals 
should be more memorable, and hence more likely to be culturally transmitted, than 
information from non-prestigious sources, particularly for novel, controversial argu-
ments about which preexisting opinions are absent or weak. It has also been argued 
that this effect extends beyond the prestigious individual’s relevant domain of exper-
tise. We tested whether the prestige and relevance of the sources of novel, controver-
sial arguments affected the transmission of those arguments, independently of their 
content. In a four-generation linear transmission chain experiment, British participants 
(N = 192) recruited online read two conflicting arguments in favour of or against the re-
placement of textbooks by computer tablets in schools. Each of the two conflicting ar-
guments was associated with one of three sources with different levels of prestige and 
relevance (high prestige, high relevance; high prestige, low relevance; low prestige, low 
relevance). Participants recalled the pro-tablets and anti-tablets arguments associated 
with each source and their recall was then passed to the next participant within their 
chain. Contrary to our predictions, we did not find a reliable effect of either the prestige 
or relevance of the sources of information on transmission fidelity. We discuss whether 
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the lack of a reliable effect of prestige on recall might be a consequence of differences 
between how prestige operates in this experiment and in everyday life.
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chain – social psychology
1 Introduction
The diffusion of knowledge, skills, attitudes, norms and other forms of infor-
mation within societies via cultural transmission/social learning depends not 
only on the content of that information, but also on the characteristics of the 
source of the information. For example, when Hollywood actor Angelina Jolie 
wrote a newspaper article about her decision to undergo a preventive double 
mastectomy due to testing positive for a gene associated with breast cancer 
(Jolie, 2013), there followed an increase in online searches for information 
about breast cancer (Juthe, Zaharchuk, & Wang, 2015), increased demand for 
genetic screening of this disease (Desai & Jena, 2016), and an increase in the 
number of referrals to undergo similar preventive operations (Evans et al., 
2015). While the content of Jolie’s article surely played some role, it seems plau-
sible that her prominence and success as an actor also influenced the subse-
quent spread of knowledge regarding breast cancer screening.
This distinction between the content and the source of culturally transmit-
ted information has received much attention in the field of cultural evolu-
tion, which seeks to provide general explanations for cultural change that are 
rooted in both psychology and evolutionary theory (Henrich, 2015; Mesoudi, 
2011). Our focus here is on the latter: the influence of the source. Cultural 
evolution researchers call this model-based transmission bias (Henrich & 
McElreath, 2003; Wood, Kendal, & Flynn, 2013), referring to the transmission 
advantage of information provided by models with specific characteristics 
such as being successful, older, genetically related, or prestigious. Such biases 
are typically evolutionarily adaptive. For example, learning from models who 
are successful (e.g. knowledgeable or skillful) within a valued domain gener-
ally leads to the acquisition of fitness-enhancing knowledge/skills. Therefore, 
preferentially copying successful models (success bias) is typically an adaptive 
strategy when the knowledge or skill cannot easily be acquired on one’s own, 
via asocial learning.
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However, assessing the knowledge or skill of potential models within a do-
main is often difficult. The learner may not have enough expertise to correctly 
infer the quality of others’ information. Even if they do, this inference may be 
costly, for example requiring lengthy observation of the model to ensure their 
success is not due to luck. To reduce these costs, Henrich and Gil-White (2001) 
suggested that social learners use short-cuts to infer the success of models 
from whom to learn. These shortcuts might involve using fixed characteristics 
of models such as job titles ( first-order cues) or behaviours displayed by other 
individuals towards the model, such as the amount of attention paid by others 
to the model (second-order cues) (Jiménez & Mesoudi, 2019). The use of these 
shortcuts is known as prestige bias or prestige-biased social learning (Henrich & 
Gil-White, 2001; Jiménez & Mesoudi, 2019). Prestige bias is adaptive (Henrich 
& Gil-White, 2001; Jiménez & Mesoudi, 2019) because prestige (e.g. amount of 
attention received by a model) is associated with high knowledge or skill with-
in valued domains (Garfield, Hubbard, & Hagen, 2019; Henrich & Gil-White, 
2001; StibbardHawkes, Attenborough, & Marlowe, 2018; Von Rueden, 2014; 
although see Reyes-Garcia et al., 2008). If there is a positive relationship be-
tween the success and prestige of a model, then using prestige cues to select 
models from whom to learn (prestige bias) is a cheaper way to acquire mostly 
valuable knowledge/skills than assessing directly the competence of the model 
(success bias).
Our aim in this study is to experimentally test whether information attrib-
uted to prestigious sources is culturally transmitted with greater fidelity than 
information attributed to nonprestigious sources, as predicted by Henrich 
and Gil-White (2001). We use the transmission chain design (Bartlett, 1932; 
Mesoudi, 2007) in which participants are asked to recall written information, 
and the resulting recall is passed to the next participant to read and recall 
and so on down the chain. This can reveal cumulative effects of hypothesized 
transmission biases. The information transmitted along the chains consists of 
opposing arguments about a novel and controversial issue: the replacement of 
textbooks by computer tablets at primary school. We were not interested in the 
issue itself (i.e. the content), only in the effects of prestige on its transmission 
(i.e. the source). We chose this issue because, although it engenders some de-
bate (e.g. Kleeman, 2014; Rowan, 2014), it is an issue that is not widely discussed 
and about which people lack polarized attitudes or detailed prior knowledge. 
Therefore, people’s attitudes towards tablets are unlikely to strongly affect the 
transmission of these arguments, minimising the influence of both content 
biases and individual judgement.
Previous research provides some evidence that prestige affects both re-
call in a single individual, and cultural transmission from one individual to 
241Prestige Does Not Affect the Cultural Transmission of Novel 
Journal of Cognition and Culture 20 (2020) 238–261
another. Holtgraves, Srull, and Socall (1989) had participants read conversa-
tions between two people. One group of participants were told that one of the 
speakers was higher status than the other. Another group were told that the 
two speakers had equal status. As predicted, statements were more likely to 
be recalled when they were thought to come from a high status speaker, com-
pared to the same remarks made in the equal status condition. However, this 
effect only occurred when the status information was provided before reading 
the conversations; no effect was found when status information was provided 
afterwards. There was also no effect of status when the conversations were 
acted out, rather than read. Ratcliff, Hugenberg, Shriver, and Bernstein (2011), 
meanwhile, found that participants were better at recognising faces associ-
ated with prestigious professions (e.g. CEOs or doctors) than faces associated 
with non-prestigious professions (e.g. mechanics or plumbers). However, this 
study did not address whether information provided by prestigious individu-
als was more memorable or how prestige affected the cultural transmission 
of information.
Other studies have found evidence for prestige-biased cultural transmis-
sion. Atkisson, O’Brien, and Mesoudi (2012) found that participants prefer-
entially copied virtual artifact designs that purported to come from models 
who received more attention from other participants. These prestige cues 
were even used as equally often as direct success information. Chudek, Heller, 
Birch, and Henrich (2012) similarly found that children preferentially copied 
the choice of toy or food from an adult model to whom others had attended 
to, compared to models who were ignored by others. While suggestive, these 
studies did not examine the long-term effect of prestige along chains of par-
ticipants, as afforded by the transmission chain method, nor did they exam-
ine the transmission of controversial arguments, as we did here. The latter 
is particularly important because of cases such as Angelina Jolie’s endorse-
ment of breast cancer screening, or (more troublingly) the endorsement of 
anti-vaccination arguments by celebrities such as Jenny McCarthy, where 
prestigious individuals appear to influence the adoption of controversial or 
unfamiliar arguments.
This leads to our secondary aim, which is to explore whether the effect of 
prestige on cultural transmission extends beyond the domain of expertise of 
the information source. This seems to occur when, for example, an actor has an 
effect in a medical domain like breast screening or vaccination. Although pres-
tige bias should be more beneficial within the domain of expertise of the pres-
tigious model (within-domain prestige bias), the theory (Henrich & Gil-White, 
2001; Jiménez & Mesoudi, 2019) assumes that people should copy prestigious 
individuals beyond their domain of expertise (cross-domain prestige bias): 
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(i) when success information in the domain of interest is unavailable and aso-
cial learning in that domain is costly or difficult (general copying bias) and 
(ii) when there is a positive correlation in skill between domains due to general 
characteristics such as IQ or perseverance that lead the model to be successful 
across multiple domains (cross-domain general ability). The first of these, at 
least, would apply to controversial arguments for which people have little pre-
existing knowledge.
However, the evidence regarding cross-domain prestige bias is mixed. In 
the aforementioned study by Chudek et al. (2012), the effect of prestige did 
not extend beyond the domain within which the model expressed a choice. 
For example, a prestigious model’s choice of food did not affect whether their 
choice of toy was also copied. Cases such as the ‘Angelina Jolie effect’ remain 
anecdotal and ambiguous, given the difficulty of using observational data to 
determine cause-effect relationships. When Jolie wrote her article, there was 
already growing interest in genetic screening for cancer, and guidelines about 
detecting breast cancer had just been published by public health organisations 
(Acerbi, 2019). Moreover, it is difficult to separate the effect of the content of 
the information she provided from the effect of her prestige. Given this am-
biguous but limited evidence, there is a need for more experimental tests of 
the domain generality of prestige.
Consequently, we sought to test whether the influence of prestige on cul-
tural transmission only occurs in the relevant domain of expertise of the pres-
tigious model, or whether it extends beyond the relevant domain. We therefore 
used three sources that varied in prestige and relevance: a relevant high pres-
tige source (Head of the Department of Education of a leading university), an 
irrelevant high prestige source (aircraft pilot), and an irrelevant low prestige 
source (cleaner). Prestige was manipulated using job titles (a first-order cue), 
following previous non-transmission chain experiments (Dalmaso, Galfano, 
Coricelli, & Castelli, 2014; Dalmaso, Pavan, Castelli, & Galfano, 2012; Ratcliff 
et al., 2011). This contrasts with typical manipulations of prestige in the cultural 
evolution literature, which usually entails a second-order cue: the amount of 
attention displayed by other individuals to the model (Atkisson et al., 2012; 
Chudek, Baron, & Birch, 2016; Chudek et al., 2012). Nevertheless, both types of 
cues should be positively correlated given that individuals with prestigious job 
titles (e.g. doctors) tend to be paid more attention by others (Dalmaso et al., 
2014; Dalmaso et al., 2012; Ratcliff et al., 2011), due to both cues being used as 
proxies for competence.
In light of the above theory and evidence, we preregistered (https://osf.io/
pk2rz/) the following two hypotheses:
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H1: The arguments provided by high prestige sources will be better re-
called over generations than arguments provided by low prestige sources.
H2: The arguments provided by high relevance sources will be better re-




The study was approved by the Biosciences Ethical Committee at the University 
of Exeter Cornwall Campus on the 6th June 2017 (Ref 2017/1963).
2.2 Participants
Participants were recruited online through Prolific (www.prolific.ac) (Peer, 
Samat, Brandimarte, & Acquisti, 2016) following the procedure stated in the 
preregistration (https://osf.io/pk2rz/). We used pre-screening filters to select 
participants who had not previously participated in any of our studies on 
Prolific, had an approval rating of 90% or above, were aged 18–60 years, spoke 
English as a first language and had British nationality.
The data was collected at four different times (one for each “cultural genera-
tion”), with 48 participants per generation across 48 separate, parallel chains. 
48 chains were necessary to provide two replications of each of the 24 counter-
balanced versions of the experimental materials (see Section 2.4). Participants 
were paid at a rate of £5.25/hour for an estimated time of completion of 
20 minutes for generations 1 and 2 and 15 minutes for generations 3 and 4.
We excluded from the dataset participants who (i) failed the attentional 
check (“If you are carefully reading the questions, select ‘Green’”), or (ii) failed 
the manipulation check to identify the professions (i.e. manipulation of pres-
tige) of the sources of the information, or (iii) read both sets of arguments 
(pro- and anti-tablets) in less than 10 seconds (1080 words/minute). The lat-
ter exclusion criterion was changed compared to the preregistered protocol, 
which originally specified a cutoff of 27 seconds (400 words/minute). After 
seeing the data for the first wave of participants it became apparent that the 
original cutoff was too strict and unnecessarily excluded large numbers of 
participants who had provided valid data. The new cutoff was derived from 
inspection of the data: three participants who read the material in less than 
10 seconds (the new cutoff) were unable to recall anything, while amongst the 
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remaining participants there was no relationship between time spent read-
ing the materials and the number of propositions correctly recalled (Bayesian 
multilevel Poisson logistic model predicting the number of propositions cor-
rectly recalled by the time spent reading each of the materials associated with 
each source and intercepts varying by participant: B = 0.001, SE = 0.003, 89% CI 
[−0.003, 0.005]), confirming that these participants provided valid data.
Excluded participants were replaced by new participants. Overall, we col-
lected responses from 288 participants (203 females, 85 males) aged 18–611 
(M = 34.57, SD = 10.12), with 192 of these participants (143 females, 49 males) 
aged 18–61 (M = 35.10, SD = 10.11) included in the study.
2.3 Materials
To select the sources of information, we asked an independent sample of 10 
Prolific participants (5 females, 5 males) aged 19–42 (M = 28.8, SD = 7.16) to 
rate 24 professions on their prestige within society and their relevance for the 
debate over whether tablets should replace books in schools. Ratings for pres-
tige were given in a 5-point Likert scale from “non-prestigous at all” (1) to ex-
tremely prestigious”. Ratings for relevance were given in a 7-point Likert scale 
from “extremely irrelevant” (-3) to “extremely relevant” (+3), respectively. We 
selected three sources who differed in their level of prestige and relevance: 
the Head of Education of a leading university (high prestige: M = 1.6, SD = 1.1; 
high relevance: M = 2.4, SD = 0.8), an aircraft pilot (high prestige: M = 1.5, 
SD = 1.2; low relevance: M = −2.1, SD = 1.3) and a cleaner (low prestige: M = −2.6, 
SD = 1; and low relevance: M = −2.2, SD = 1.2). See SM1A for a full list of profes-
sions and their associated ratings.2
In the experimental materials, the sources of information were associated 
with one of two sets of arguments in favour of and against the replacement 
of textbooks by computer tablets at primary school. Two different names 
1   Although in the pre-screening we selected an age range of 18–60, 1 participant was 61 years 
old in the experiment. This was probably a natural consequence of the pass of time, since 
participants reported their age for the pre-screening prior the participation in the study.
2   This procedure to select professions to use in the experiment on the basis of the means of rat-
ings on a Likert scale is a standard practice in psychology. However, this practice contradicts 
what students are taught about ordinal variables in statistical courses. Ordinal variables are 
categorical variables that are ordered but the distances between adjacent categories might 
be different. Consequently, this precludes carrying out mathematical operations such as ad-
dition, subtraction, multiplication, and divisions with them to obtain means and standard 
deviations. As we became more aware of the consequences of treating ordinal variables as 
continuous (Liddell & Kruschke, 2018) after data collection, we report descriptive statistics 
in SM1B that are more adequate for ordinal variables, such as medians.
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(“William Healey”3 and “Daniel Bryanson”) were used for the sources, as each 
participant read the information about two sources and their associated argu-
ments. Their names and the order of presentation were fully counterbalanced. 
The sources were described as follows:
Head of Education of a leading university (high prestige, high relevance)
William Healey [Daniel Bryanson] is the Head of the Department of Education 
of a leading university. Outside of his job, he [also] volunteers for the Australian 
Learning Trust. As a volunteer, Professor Healey [Bryanson] visits schools once a 
fortnight and teaches the children the importance of his job for society. He firmly 
supports the replacement of textbooks by computer tablets at primary schools 
for the following reasons: [He is firmly against the replacement of textbooks by 
computer tablets at primary school for the following reasons:]
Aircraft pilot (high prestige, low relevance)
William Healey [Daniel Bryanson] is a commercial Aircraft pilot who regularly 
flies between Auckland and Madrid, Paris, Amsterdam and other European desti-
nations. Outside of his job, he [also] volunteers for the Australian Learning Trust. 
As a volunteer, Mr Healey [Bryanson] visits schools once a fortnight and teaches 
the children the importance of his job for society. He firmly supports the replace-
ment of textbooks by computer tablets at primary schools for the following rea-
sons: [He is firmly against the replacement of textbooks by computer tablets at 
primary school for the following reasons:]
Cleaner (low prestige, low relevance)
William Healey [Daniel Bryanson] works as a cleaner in a telemarketing com-
pany. Outside of his job, he volunteers for the Australian Learning Trust. As a 
volunteer, Mr. Healey [Mr Bryanson] visits schools once a fortnight and teaches 
the children about the importance of his job for society. He firmly supports the 
replacement of textbooks by computer tablets at primary school for the following 
reasons: [He is firmly against the replacement of textbooks by computer tablets at 
primary school for the following reasons:]
Table 1 shows the full list of arguments in favour of (‘pro-tablets’) and against 
(‘anti-tablets’) the replacement of textbooks by computer tablets at primary 
school. ‘Pro-tablets’ arguments pointed out both the advantages of tablets (e.g. 
3   In the preregistration, we used the name “William Yellowfield”. When we were piloting the 
experiment, a colleague commented that this name was obviously made-up. Therefore, we 
decided to change it to William Healey for the experiment.
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“Computer tablets permit the storage of hundreds of books and the instant 
access to those books from everywhere”) and the disadvantages of books (e.g. 
“The continuous carrying of textbooks from home to school gives long-term 
back pain to our children”). ‘Anti-tablets’ arguments pointed out both the ad-
vantages of books (e.g. “Textbooks can last hundreds of years and they don’t 
require electricity or batteries to work”) and the disadvantages of tablets (e.g. 
“The continuous use of devices with screens such as computer tablets gives 
long-term vision problems to our children”). Both sets of arguments were cre-
ated with the explicit intention of being balanced and covering similar top-
ics. Both sets included arguments about the impact of computer tablets and 
textbooks on health, the environment, children’s learning, student distraction, 
Table 1 Arguments in favour (‘pro-tablets’) and against (‘anti-tablets’) the replacement of 
textbooks by computer tablets at primary schools used as materials to transmit 
along the transmission chains
‘Pro-tablets’ arguments ‘Anti-tablets’ arguments
The continuous carrying of textbooks 
from home to school gives long-term back 
pain to our children.
The continuous use of devices with screens 
such as computer tablets gives long-term 
vision problems to our children.
Children using computer tablets learn 
much better as they are more engaged 
and understand the material better.
Children using textbooks learn much 
better as they are more engaged and 
understand the material better.
Teachers have less control over children’s 
learning when using textbooks because 
they cannot effectively manage what 
children are doing during the class.
Children are more easily distracted when 
using computer tablets because they can 
play games instead of attending to the 
lesson.
The production of textbooks for our 
schools requires the consumption of tons 
of paper each year, which contributes to 
the problem of deforestation.
The production of computer tablets 
requires the emission of a considerable 
amount of pollutants to the air, which 
contributes to the problem of the green-
house effect.
Children need less support from their par-
ents when they use computer tablets than 
when they use textbooks because tablets 
offer personalized lessons.
Children receive more support from their 
parents when they use textbooks than 
when they use computer tablets because 
parents offer personalized help.
Computer tablets permit the storage of 
hundreds of books and the instant access 
to those books from everywhere.
Textbooks can last hundreds of years and 
they don’t require electricity or batteries 
to work.
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control by the teacher, parental support and technical aspects such as storage, 
accessibility, durability and battery life. Both sets of arguments were inspired 
by the pros and cons arguments compiled by ProCon.org (https://tablets 
-textbooks.procon.org/).
2.4 Design
A 3 (pair of sources: Cleaner vs Head of the Department of Education, Cleaner 
vs Aircraft Pilot, Head of the Department of Education vs Aircraft Pilot) × 2 
(opinions associated with sources: ‘pro-tablets’ vs ‘antitablets’, ‘antitablets vs 
protablets’) factorial design was used for this experiment. The order of pre-
sentation and the names associated with the sources (‘William Healey’ and 
‘Daniel Bryanson’) were fully counterbalanced, which resulted in 24 different 
versions of the experimental materials. As we were only interested in the in-
fluence of the sources of the information on transmission, we analyse three 
experimental conditions: Condition 1 (Head of the Department of Education 
vs Cleaner), Condition 2 (Aircraft Pilot vs Cleaner) and Condition 3 (Head of 
the Department of Education vs Aircraft Pilot).
We used the transmission chain method (Bartlett, 1932; Mesoudi, 2007) to 
experimentally simulate this controversy. This method is similar to the chil-
dren’s game “Chinese Whispers” or “Broken Telephone”. A first “generation” of 
participants read the original materials given above in Section 2.3. They then 
recalled this material from memory. Their recall is then transmitted to the next 
participant in their chain (second generation). This procedure is repeated for 
four generations in total, and across 48 separate, parallel chains to provide 
independent replications of transmission effects. This method has typically 
been used to study content transmission biases, which entail a transmission 
advantage to certain types of information due to their intrinsic characteristics 
(Henrich & McElreath, 2003) such as having a more emotional (Eriksson & 
Coultas, 2014; Stubbersfield, Tehrani, & Flynn, 2017), social (Mesoudi, Whiten, 
& Dunbar, 2006; Stubbersfield, Tehrani, & Flynn, 2014), negative (Bebbington, 
MacLeod, Ellison, & Fay, 2017) or stereotypical (Bangerter, 2000; Kashima, 
2000) content. The novelty of the present study is to use this method to study 
a model-based transmission bias: prestige bias. Transmission chain experi-
ments permit the study of the consequences of experimental conditions over 
multiple transmission events. Single-generation experiments sometimes 
cannot detect certain transmission biases, as the effects of the experimental 
conditions are only revealed after multiple transmission events (e.g. Jiménez, 
Stubbersfield, & Tehrani, 2018), or they are detected in the first generation and 
then reversed in latter generations (e.g. Kashima, 2000).
In our experiment, we kept the description of the sources of information 
(i.e. names and job titles) constant along the chains, i.e. these were not subject 
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to participant recall. This ensured that our manipulation was applied across 
all generations and all chains, and simulated the fact that prestigious individu-
als tend to be acknowledged and recognised by most members of a society 
or social group. The content of the information (the arguments in favour of 
and against the replacement of textbooks by computer tablets at primary 
school) was allowed to vary as the information provided to participants in 
generations 2–4 was the information recalled by the participant in the previ-
ous generation within their chain.
2.5 Procedure
Prior to the presentation of the experimental materials, participants were 
asked their opinion about the replacement of textbooks by computer tablets 
at primary school (‘pre-test’ opinion) by rating their agreement with the state-
ment “If the decision were in my hands, I would replace all the textbooks with 
computer tablets in primary schools” on a 7-point Likert scale from “totally dis-
agree” (−3) to “totally agree” (+3). They were also asked about their familiarity 
with computer tablets using a 7-point Likert scale from “very unfamiliar” (−3) 
to “very familiar” (+3).
Participants were then randomly assigned to one of 48 transmission chains 
and provided the following instructions: 
In many schools across the world, computer tablets have started to re-
place traditional textbooks. This recent change has given rise to a heated 
debate about the benefits and risks of computer tablets and textbooks for 
children’s education. We have asked a number of volunteers at schools in 
Australia about their views on this issue. In the following, you will learn 
about two of these volunteers and about their opinions about the use of 
textbooks and computer tablets at primary school. It is very important 
that you read the information at a pace that allows you full comprehen-
sion as you will be asked some questions about this information later.
Participants then read information about one of the sources (e.g. cleaner) and 
one set of arguments (e.g. ‘pro-tablets’) and, immediately afterwards, informa-
tion about another source (e.g. Head of the Department of Education) and 
the other set of arguments (e.g. ‘anti-tablets’). Participants in generation 1 read 
the original arguments created by us. Participants in generations 2–4 read the 
arguments as they were recalled by the participant in the previous genera-
tion within their chain. Spelling and grammar mistakes were corrected before 
transmitting the information from one participant to the next.
Participants were then asked to identify the source professions they had read 
from a list of six professions (Head of the Department of Infectious Diseases of 
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a leading university, cleaner, Head of the Department of Education of a lead-
ing university, writer, warehouseman, aircraft pilot and taxi driver) and to rate 
the prestige within society of the two sources they had read about on a 5-point 
Likert scale from “not prestigious at all” (1) to “incredibly prestigious” (5) and 
their relevance for the debate about the benefits and risks of tablets and 
books at schools on a 7-point Likert scale from “very irrelevant” (−3) to “very 
relevant” (+3).
There was then a surprise free recall test in which participants had to re-
call the arguments provided by each source. We originally intended to force 
participants to do this for each source for at least 2.5 minutes and no more 
than 5 minutes. However, a technical problem disabled the feature that forced 
participants to stay on the task at least 2.5 minutes. Therefore, participants 
submitted their responses when they considered they had finished, which 
is the standard procedure for transmission chain experiments. The feature 
that prevented participants to complete the recall task beyond 5 minutes 
worked correctly.
Finally, participants provided demographic details (age, gender, nationality, 
first language, nearest city, and profession) and were asked again about their 
opinion about whether computer tablets should replace books at primary 
schools by rating their agreement with the statement “If I were an education 
policy maker I would replace textbooks by computer tablets all over the coun-
try” on a 7-point Likert scale from “totally disagree” (−3) to “totally agree” (+3). 
They were also asked to provide reasons to support one or the other side by 
writing their own opinion within a textbox. At the end, participants were in-
formed about the goal of the experiment and our hypotheses.
2.6 Coding and Data Analyses
Participants’ recall accuracy was assessed by comparing their correct recall 
with a preregistered table (https://osf.io/6d5ga/) containing twelve central 
propositions, i.e. verbs, adjectives or other relational terms followed by com-
plementary nouns, which capture the core meaning of the sentence (Kintsch, 
1974). For instance, the core meaning of “the continuous carrying of textbooks 
from home to school gives long-term back pain to our children” is “textbooks 
give back pain (to children)”. This table specified which elements were impor-
tant (central propositions) to recall within each sentence. The recall was coded 
by the first author. A second coder, who was blind to the hypothesis, coded 
12.5% of the chains (6 chains). We found a high inter-coder reliability between 
both coders (Cohen’s Kappa  =  0.84).
All statistical analyses were conducted with the Bayesian package brms 
(Bürkner, 2017) in R 3.5.3 (R Core Team, 2019). This was a change from the 
preregistered script (https://osf.io/dt2uq/), in which we did the analyses with 
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dummy data with the package lme4 (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015). 
The change was due to the advantage of brms in handling ordinal predictors 
(Bürkner & Charpentier, 2018). This change did not affect the qualitative con-
clusions derived from the results (see SM2 and SM3).
3 Results
3.1 Manipulation Checks: Prestige and Relevance of the Sources
As the ratings of prestige and relevance were measured in an ordinal scale, we 
used the median, range, and frequency of each rating to describe the central 
tendency and the distribution of the ratings for each source (Figures 1 and 2 
and SM4). For the same reason, we conducted Bayesian multilevel ordinal lo-
gistic models with source as a predictor. Because each participant rated the 
prestige and relevance of two sources of information, the intercepts were al-
lowed to vary by participant. For these analyses, we used the default priors in 
brms (Bürkner, 2017).
We expected that the Head of the Department of Education (henceforth 
‘educator’) and the pilot would be rated similarly prestigious, and both rated 
more prestigious than the cleaner.
Figure 1  
The distribution of ratings of prestige for the 
three sources of information: Head of the 
Department of Education (“educator”), pilot 
and cleaner. Prestige was measured on a 
5-point scale from “Not prestigious at all” (1) 
to “incredibly prestigious” (5). Thick lines 
represent the median, the box the middle 
50% of ratings or inter-quantile range, the 
lower whisker ranges from the 25th percentile 
to the smallest value no smaller than 1.5 times 
the inter-quantile range and outliers are 
ratings outside 1.5 times the inter-quantile 
range.
Figure 2  
The distribution of ratings of relevance for 
the three sources of information: Head of the 
Department of Education (“educator”), pilot 
and cleaner. Relevance was measured on a 
7-point Likert scale from “very irrelevant” 
(−3) to “very relevant” (+3). The thick line 
represents the median, the box the middle 
50% of ratings or inter-quantile range, 
the lower whisker ranges from the 25th 
percentile to the smallest value no smaller 
than 1.5 times the inter-quantile range and 
outliers are ratings outside 1.5 times the 
inter-quantile range.
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Prestige was rated on a 5-point Likert scale from “not prestigious at all” (1) to 
“incredibly prestigious” (5). The educator was considered the most prestigious 
(Median = 4), being mostly rated as “(4) very prestigious” (50%), followed by 
“(3) somewhat prestigious” (37%). The pilot was seen as less prestigious than 
the educator (Median = 3), being mostly rated as “(3) somewhat prestigious” 
(58%) followed by “(4) very prestigious” (32%). The cleaner was seen as the 
least prestigious (Median = 2), being rated mostly as “(2) hardly prestigious” 
(40%), followed by “(3) somewhat prestigious” (30%) and “(1) not prestigious 
at all” (27%). As expected, the regression model confirmed that the educator 
(B = 5.26, SE = 0.51, 89% CI: [4.46, 6.11]) and the pilot (B = 3.95, SE = 0.42, 89% 
CI: [3.29, 4.62]) were rated as more prestigious than the cleaner.
Contrary to expectations, however, the educator was rated as more presti-
gious than the pilot (B = 1.31, SE = 0.32, 89% CI: [0.81, 1.82]), although the mag-
nitude of this difference was much smaller than that between the educator 
and cleaner, and between pilot and cleaner.
We also expected that the educator would be rated more relevant to the 
issue of tablets in schools than both the pilot and cleaner, who would be rated 
similarly (non) relevant. Relevance was rated on a 7-point Likert scale from 
“very irrelevant” (−3) to “very relevant” (+3). The educator was considered most 
relevant (Median = 2), being mainly rated as +3 (46%). The pilot was consid-
ered the next most relevant (Median = 1), being mostly rated as +1 (33%). The 
cleaner was considered the least relevant (Median = 0), being mainly rated as 
+1 (30%). As expected, the regression model confirmed that the pilot (B = −3.08, 
SE = 0.36, 89% CI: [−3.65, −2.51]) and the cleaner (B = −3.40, SE = 0.35, −89% CI: 
[−3.96, −2.85]) were considered less relevant sources of information than the 
educator, while there was little difference between the pilot and the cleaner 
(B = 0.31, SE = 0.25, 89% CI: [−0.08, 0.71]).
3.2 Cumulative Recall
Figure 3 shows the recall of correct central propositions across cultural gen-
erations by opinion (‘pro-tablets’ vs ‘anti-tablets’, Figure 3A) and source of the 
information (educator, pilot and cleaner, Figure 3B). As in similar transmission 
chain experiments, Figure 3 shows that recall decreased over cultural genera-
tions, with a larger decrease from generation 1 to generation 2 than for subse-
quent generations. Unexpectedly, the ‘anti-tablets’ opinion seems to have been 
better transmitted than the ‘pro-tablets’ opinion (Figure 3A). Contrary to our 
hypotheses, Figure 3B suggests little difference in cumulative recall between 
the three sources of information.
To statistically analyse these trends, we produced several Bayesian multilev-
el Poisson regression models with intercepts varying by chain and compared 
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their model fit (Table 2). Model fit was compared using leave-one-out cross 
validation information criterion (LOOIC; Vehtari, Gelman, & Gabry, 2017), 
which can be interpreted similarly to Akaike information criterion (AIC) or 
Watanabe-Akaike information criterion (WAIC): a lower LOOIC indicates bet-
ter fit to the data.
We first ran a generation model with generation (one to four) as the sole 
predictor of recall (number of correctly recalled propositions). Generation was 
treated as a monotonic variable (Bürkner & Charpentier, 2018) as recall tends 
to decrease across generations but the amount of the decrease varies between 
adjacent generations. This model was compared with an opinion model, which 
included opinion (‘pro-tablets’ vs ‘anti-tablets’) and generation as predictors. 
As the opinion model (LOOIC = 1301.2, SE = 14.4) had a better fit to the data than 
the generation model (LOOIC = 1311.1 =, SE = 14.3), the opinion model was se-
lected as the control model to compare against subsequent models. (Allowing 
an interaction between generation and opinion did not improve the model fit 
by much, LOOIC = 1298.5, SE = 14.3. Including participants’ degree of agreement 
with the statement “I would replace all the textbooks with computer tablets in 
Figure 3 Raw means for the recall of information with 1.60 standard error bars (corresponding to 
89% CI as given in the text) plotted against generation. A: the ‘anti-tablets’ arguments were 
better transmitted than the ‘protablets’ arguments. B: contrary to H1 and H2, the information 
provided by the three sources (Head of the Department of Education, Pilot and Cleaner) was 
similarly transmitted.
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primary schools” prior to being exposed to the experimental materials also did 
not improve the model fit. See SM3 for details).
To test H1, which stated that the information provided by high pres-
tige sources of information (educator and pilot) would be better recalled 
than the information provided by the low prestige source (cleaner), we ran 
a model (‘source model’) which included source of information as a predic-
tor of recall (with cleaner as reference category) in addition to generation 
and opinion.
Table 2 Unstandardized Coefficients (B) and their standard errors (in brackets) for each of the main 
regression models. Square brackets indicate reference categories. Variables modelled as mono-
tonic effects are labelled mo(variable). More regression models and further details can be found 
in the SM3. LOOIC  =  leave-one-out cross validation information criterion (lower values indi-
cate better fit to the data; see text for details). Model weights were calculated using pseudo-
Bayesian model average weights with Bayesian bootstrap (Vehtari & Gabry, 2019; Yao, Vehtari, 
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LOOIC 1311.1 1301.2 1302.5 1302.2 1302.6 1303.8
model weights 0.002 0.329 0.208 0.205 0.167 0.089
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Consistent with hypothesis H1, the information provided by the presti-
gious sources, the educator (M = 3.09, SD = 1.70, B = 0.06, SE = 0.08, 89% CI 
[−0.07, 0.18]) and the pilot (M = 3.09, SD = 1.77, B = 0.06, SE = 0.08, 89% CI 
[−0.06, 0.19]), were better recalled than the less prestigious cleaner (M = 2.93, 
SD = 1.75). However, the credible intervals for both comparisons include 0, in-
dicating an unreliable effect of source of information on recall. Furthermore, 
the fit of the source model (LOOIC = 1302.5, SE = 14.5) was worse than the fit of 
the control model (LOOIC = 1301.2, SE = 14.4). Allowing an interaction between 
source and generation did not improve model fit (LOOIC = 1305.5, SE = 14.5). 
Consequently, the results did not support H1.
To test H2, which stated that the information provided by the high relevance 
source (educator) would be better recalled than the information provided by 
the low relevance sources (pilot and cleaner), we refitted the source model 
with educator as the reference category. Contrary to H2, the information pro-
vided by the educator was not better recalled than the information provided 
by the pilot (B = 0.01, SE = 0.07, 89% CI [−0.11, 0.12]) and the cleaner (B = −0.06, 
SE = 0.08, 89% CI [−0.18, 0.07]). Consequently, the results did not support H2.
An alternative way to test H1 and H2 is to use the participants’ own ratings 
of prestige and relevance as predictors of recall, instead of assuming based on 
the independent raters’ judgements (see Section 2.3) that both the pilot and 
the educator are high prestige sources (with the educator also being a relevant 
high prestige source) and the cleaner a low prestige source.
As prestige and relevance were ordinal measures, we modelled them as 
monotonic variables (Bürkner & Charpentier, 2018): the effects of prestige and 
relevance on recall should increase or decrease with higher ratings but the ef-
fect might vary between adjacent ratings. In addition to generation and opin-
ion, these models included ratings of prestige (prestige model: LOOIC = 1302.2, 
SE = 14.5), ratings of relevance (relevance model: LOOIC = 1302.6, SE = 14.5) or rat-
ings of both prestige and relevance (prestige-relevance model: LOOIC = 1303.8, 
SE = 14.5). Marginal effects of the latter prestige-relevance model are shown 
in Figure 4. In these models, the effects of prestige and relevance were in the 
expected direction: prestige (prestige model: B = 0.05, SE = 0.14, 89% CI [−0.17, 
0.27]) and relevance (relevance model: B = 0.03, SE = 0.13, 89% CI [−0.17, 0.24]) 
both positively predicted recall in the prestige model and relevance model 
respectively, while for the prestige-relevance model, the effect of relevance 
(B = 0.01, SE = 0.13, 89% CI [−0.19, 0.23]) diminished after accounting for pres-
tige (B = 0.05, SE = 0.15, 89% CI [0.17, 0.28]). However, the credible intervals for 
both variables in all models include 0 indicating unreliable effects of prestige 
and relevance ratings on recall. Furthermore, none of these models had better 
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fit than the control model (LOOIC = 1301.2). Consequently, these alternative 
analyses did not provide support for either H1 or H2.
4 Discussion
In this experiment, we studied whether the prestige and the relevance of sourc-
es of information affect the transmission of arguments in favour (“pro-tables”) 
and against (“anti-tablets”) the replacement of textbooks with computer tab-
lets in schools. Contrary to our predictions, we failed to find a reliable advan-
tage of the prestige (H1) or relevance (H2) of the sources of information on 
Figure 4 Marginal effects plots of the prestige-relevance model. A: The correct recall of 
propositions decreased monotonically with generation (B = −0.95, SE = 0.09, 89% 
CI [−1.09, −0.81]), the greatest decrease being between generation 1 to generation 2. 
B: The pro-tablets view was transmitted worse than the anti-tablets view (B = −0.19, 
SE = 0.06, 89% CI [−0.29, −0.10]). C: Prestige is positively related to recall but this 
effect is very weak and the wide standard error shows that it is unreliable (B = 0.05, 
SE = 0.15, 89% CI [−0.19, 0.28]). D: Relevance is positively related to recall but this 
effect is very weak and the wide standard error shows that is unreliable (B = 0.01, 
SE = 0.13, 89% CI [−0.19, 0.23]).
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the transmission of their arguments using two different analytical procedures: 
(i) assuming that the sources differ in prestige and relevance in a similar way 
for all participants in our sample (Head of the Department of Education: high 
prestige, high relevance; airline pilot: high prestige, low relevance; cleaner: low 
prestige, low relevance) and (ii) using the participants’ own ratings of prestige 
and relevance of the sources as predictors of recall.
Although the effect of prestige on recall was statistically unreliable, it was 
in the expected direction. This suggests that either prestige has a weak ef-
fect on the recall of information or the results in the expected direction were 
due to chance. If the effects of prestige on recall are too small to have multi-
generational effects in our experiment, this might indicate that the prestige of 
the source is not important in reality, where information is transmitted repeat-
edly from person to person. This would mean that, contrary to Henrich and 
Gil-White’s (2001) hypothesis, there is no intrinsic memory bias to recall better 
what prestigious individuals say or argue. It would also mean that purported 
cases of prestige bias in real life (e.g. the ‘Angelina Jolie effect’, see Introduction) 
are exaggerated or spurious.
Alternatively, people might recall better what prestigious individuals say 
due to repeated or redundant transmission (Morin, 2016). That is, outside the 
experimental setting, people are exposed to the opinions of prestigious indi-
viduals multiple times (e.g. on TV, radio, and conversations) and this multiple 
exposure is what makes them more memorable. Future transmission chain 
studies could manipulate both the prestige of the sources and the number of 
exposures or number of sources per argument within each generation (e.g. 
Eriksson & Coultas, 2012; Kempe & Mesoudi, 2014), rather just one source per 
argument, to test this alternative.
Another possibility is that our manipulation of prestige (i.e. ascribing opin-
ions to fictitious sources of information with different levels of prestige) does 
not adequately capture the way prestige works in everyday life. In large scale 
societies, especially in the digital era, people encounter individuals who are 
prestigious at different societal levels. Prestigious individuals at the group level 
are people who are admired and respected within a face-to-face group united 
by a common task or activity (e.g. a basketball team or a student class). Here, 
prestigious individuals and the people who admire them know each other 
and interact. Prestigious individuals at the society level (e.g. Hollywood actors/
actresses, pop singers, and professional footballers) do not normally know 
personally their admirers. Rather, their admirers have the illusion of familiar-
ity and personally knowing the prestigious individuals, giving rise to a type of 
relationship known as para-social interaction (Horton & Wohl, 1956). At both 
levels, social learners already know and admire the prestigious individual, 
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while participants in our study were for the first time exposed to the (fic-
tional) sources. It is possible that, if participants already knew and admired 
the sources of information, the effects of prestige on recall might have been 
stronger. For example, if fans of a famous singer such as Beyoncé listens to her 
arguing in favour or against the replacement of computer tablets at school, 
these fans might recall better these arguments than similar arguments pro-
vided by other sources that they know but they do not admire. Nevertheless, 
similar manipulations to the one used in our study have been effective in 
demonstrating a positive effect of prestige on attention (Dalmaso et al., 2014; 
Dalmaso et al., 2012; Ratcliff et al., 2011). This suggests that prestige-biased 
social learning might have different effects on different measures of influence 
such as recall of information, attention towards the sources, opinion forma-
tion, etc. (Jiménez & Mesoudi, 2019). Future research will need to determine 
whether prestige-biased social learning only occurs at certain levels (e.g. 
decision-making under uncertainty, attention towards sources) but not oth-
ers (e.g. memory).
The recall advantage of the “anti-tablets” arguments over the “pro-tablets” 
arguments was unexpected. It is possible that the anti-tablets advantage was 
caused by a confirmation bias effect, i.e. better recall of information that is con-
gruent with pre-existing attitudes (Frost et al., 2015). Supporting this, the full 
sample of participants was initially slightly against the replacement of text-
books by computer tablets at schools (Median = −1). However, participants’ 
attitudes towards tablets did not predict recall, which contradicts the confir-
mation bias explanation (see also Jiménez, Mesoudi, & Tehrani, 2020).
In conclusion, this experiment does not provide convincing evidence in 
support of a prestige bias in the recall of information. To our knowledge, this 
is the first experiment studying this question. Therefore, it is difficult to know 
whether the prestige of the source of information genuinely does not affect 
recall, or whether our study suffers from methodological limitations (e.g. our 
manipulations of prestige). Given the potentially important consequences of 
prestige-driven information diffusion, such as the spread of attitudes towards 
breast screening or vaccination, we encourage further tests of whether infor-
mation attributed to prestigious sources is preferentially recalled and trans-
mitted through society.
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